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WHY CRAFTISN'T SCARY 
Steve R. Johnson· 
Editors' Synopsis: The Supreme Court recently decided Craft, in which it 
held that the federal tax lien attaches to a tax-debtor spouse's interest in 
property held in tenancy by the entirety. Responding to concerns that 
were voiced most frequently about Craft, this Article argues that Craft 
does not impermissibly impinge on the traditional state role in establish-
ing property and debtor-creditor rules. The Article concludes by 
describing how rights and legitimate interests of non tax-debtor spouses 
can be safeguarded in light of Craft. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States decided United 
States v. Craft. 1 The Court held that the federal tax lien attaches to a tax-
debtor spouse's interest in property held in tenancy by the entirety even 
when the other spouse does not owe tax and state law provides that 
entireties property and interests cannot be reached by separate creditors of 
only one spouse. 
Craft was correctly decided. The older, contrary view that Craft 
displaced was fundamentally at odds with federal tax collection analysis as 
laid out by the Court. In addition, the old view invited tax abuse and 
created unfairness. 2 
Despite the wisdom of Craft, the decision has troubled some commen-
tators. This is not surprising. As those involved in law reform efforts will 
readily attest, human beings, especially legal professionals, tend to eye 
change with suspicion. Though unsurprising, the concern about Craft is 
unnecessary. The message of this Article is that Craft is neither radical nor 
dangerous. Some of the concerns are misplaced. Other, more legitimate 
concerns can be assuaged by sensible answers to the implementation issues 
that arise as a result of Craft. 
Part II of this Article describes the issue addressed in Craft and the 
Court's resolution of that issue. Parts III and IV address the two concerns 
most frequently voiced about Craft. Part III maintains that Craft does not 
impermissibly impinge on the traditional role of the states in establishing 
property and debtor-creditor rules. Part IV describes how the rights and 
legitimate interests of the spouses not owing tax can be safeguarded in light 
of Craft. 
A theme underlying this Article is that the Craft decision is not, and 
should not be viewed as, a bolt from out of the blue. The decision was 
foreshadowed by earlier Court cases and represents the application of well-
established rules and principles to the entirety area. We have lived with 
those rules and principles successfully; likewise, we can adapt to Craft 
without undue disruption or inconvenience. 
1 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002). 
2 See Steve R. Johnson, Fog Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties 
Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 Mo. L. REV. 839, 846-76 (1995) [hereinafter 
"Johnson I"], and Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax 
Lien to Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163, 1171-74 (2000) [hereinafter 
"Johnson II"] (discussing the deficiencies in detail). The Court cited Johnson II in Craft; 
see 122 S. Ct. at 1424. 
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II. FOUND A TIO NS 
Understanding Craft requires an appreciation of the Court's decision in 
December 1999 in Drye v. United States.3 Thus, this part of the Article 
begins with Drye and then advances to Craft. 
A. Drye 
Drye is a landmark case delineating the respective roles of federal and 
state law in federal tax lien analysis. Although a number of special liens 
also exist, 4 the general federal tax lien is by far the most important. The 
general lien comes into existence when the Internal Revenue Service 
("Service") has assessed the tax and the taxpayer has failed to pay it after 
the Service has made notice and demand for payment. 5 Once it arises, the 
lien relates back to the date on which the assessment was made and 
continues until the liability has been paid or "becomes unenforceable by 
reason oflapse of time."6 The statute oflimitations on collection typically 
expires ten years after the assessment was made, 7 although many circum-
stances suspend the running of this limitations period. 8 
The scope of the general tax lien matters most for present purposes. 
The general tax lien is governed by Internal Revenue Code ("Code") 
section 63 21, which provides that the lien attaches to "all property and 
rights to property, whether real or personal" of the tax delinquent.9 The 
word "all" makes the statutory language sound sweeping, and that is how 
the Court consistently has read it. For example, in 1945, the Court 
remarked: "Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a 
purpose to assure the collection of taxes."10 In 1985, the Court reempha-
sized that the language of section 6321 "is broad and reveals on its face that 
Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might 
have."11 
This broad reading of section 6321 reflects an underlying purpose of 
3 528 U.S. 49 (1999). 
4 See I.R.C. §§ 6324(a), 6324A, 6324B (estate tax), 6324(b) (gift tax), 5004 (taxes on 
distilled spirits) (2000). 
5 See id. §§ 620l(a), 6203, 6303(a), 6321. 
6 Id. § 6322. 
7 See id. § 6502(a)(l). 
8 See, e.g., id. §§ 6502(a), 6503. 
9 Id. § 6321. 
10 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945). 
11 United States v. Nat'I Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1985). 
442 37 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 
fundamental importance. Long ago, the Court noted that "taxes are the 
life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an 
imperious need."12 The Court has repeated this recognition several times 
since, 13 and contemporary national and international events surely reinforce 
it. 
But precisely what are "property and rights to property"? The Code 
does not define the terms, and nor do the Treasury Regulations promul-
gated thereunder. That being so, one naturally thinks of the rich body of 
state property law and wonders what role it may play in the enterprise. 
State law does at least the following three things: (1) it creates estates, 
interests, and rights in property; (2) less frequently, it categorizes the 
powers created-that is, it labels them as property or nonproperty; and (3) 
it establishes debtor-creditor rules, that is, it declares how and when 
creditors may proceed against property to satisfy unpaid debts and 
identifies property that is immune or exempt from creditors. 14 Which, if 
any, of such rules apply to or are incorporated into federal tax collection 
analysis? 
The role of the first and third of the above categories has been 
relatively clear for a long time. One does look to state law to ascertain 
what powers the tax debtor has as to the property out of which the Service 
seeks to effect collection. 15 And, one does not look to state debtor-creditor 
rules or procedures16 or to state-created immunities and exemptions. 17 For 
example, the federal tax lien attaches to, and the Service may collect unpaid 
12 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 604 (1990); Nat'/ Bank of 
Commerce, 472 U.S. at 733. 
14 Federal law may do some of the same, of course. Sometimes federal law creates 
property rights. See, e.g., First Victoria Nat'! Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that rice growing acreage history under federal agriculture statute was 
property for federal estate tax purposes). Also, the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., is 
a major body of debtor-creditor rules. Still, taken as a whole, state property rules are 
considerably more numerous than federal property rules. 
15 This is not intended to exclude resorting to federal law if federal law creates rights. 
The reference to state law is simply short-hand for the fact that, far more frequently, state 
law is the source of creation or authorization. 
16 "[T]he consequences that attach [after determination that the interest involved is 
property or a right to property] is a matter left to federal law." United States v. Rodgers, 
461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983); see also Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722-23; United 
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958). 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1971); Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6334-l(c) (2002). 
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taxes from disability payments 18 and retirement benefits 19 even though state 
law expressly places them beyond the reach of the creditors of recipients. 
Considerable confusion, however, surrounds the second element. The 
better view always has been that state labels and categorizations are not 
controlling, or even relevant2° to whether a particular item rises to the level 
of being property or a property right for section 6321 purposes.21 Many 
holdings support this view.22 Many Court utterances also give effect to 
this. But other opinions contain loose language that could be inter-
preted-and sometimes has been interpreted-to mean that state law could 
control the definitional question. 23 
Thus the matter stood when the Court took up Drye. Narrowly put, the 
issue in Drye was whether the general tax lien attaches to disclaimed 
interests. Rohn F. Drye, Jr. had unpaid tax assessments of nearly a third of 
a million dollars. He was the sole heir of his mother's estate of $230,000. 
However, he disclaimed his interest in the estate, causing it to pass to his 
daughter. She used the proceeds to establish a spendthrift trust. She and 
her parents were the beneficiaries; their attorney was the trustee. The 
Service asserted that its liens against Mr. Drye attached to the disclaimed 
interest. 24 
As is the rule in most states,25 the law of Arkansas (where Drye lived) 
provides that a disclaimer "relates back for all purposes to the date of death 
of the decedent,"26 creating the legal fiction that the disclaimant prede-
18 See Fried v. New York Life Ins. Co., 241F.2d504, 505-07 (2d Cir. 1957). 
19 See United States v. Wagner, 235 F. Supp. 854, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
2° For an early statement of this position by a renowned commentator, see Edmond N. 
Cahn
2 
Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 816 (1943). 
1 A state "cannot thwart the operation of the Tax Code by classifying the interests it 
has created as something other than property rights." In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc., 
911F.2d1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990). 
22 In many cases, licenses, expressly labeled as "privileges" and not as "property" by 
state law, were held to be section 6321 property or property rights. See, e.g., United States 
v. Battley, 969 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1992); 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Rest., 
Inc., 790 F.2d 354, 358 (3d Cir. 1986); JFWIRS, Ltd. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 566, 
568-70 (M.D. Pa. 1985). 
23 See Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Post-Drye Tax Lien 
Analysis, 5 FLA. TAX REv. 415, 426-32 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson III] (discussing the pre-
Drye cases). 
24 See Drye, 528 U.S. at 52. 
25 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-801(c) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 207 (Supp. 
1998~. 
6 ARK. CODE ANN.§ 28-2-108(a)(3) (Michie 1998). 
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ceased the decedent. Accordingly, Mr. Drye maintained that, by virtue of 
the relating-back disclaimer, he never had a property interest in his 
mother's estate. Thus, there was nothing to which the tax liens against him 
could attach. 
The Court held unanimously for the Service. For present purposes, the 
key part of the Court's opinion was its clarification of the role of state law 
in federal tax lien analysis. The Court held: "The Internal Revenue Code's 
prescriptions are most sensibly read to look to state law for delineation of 
the taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determina-
tion whether those rights or interests constitute 'property' or 'rights to 
property' within the meaning of§ 6321."27 
Accordingly, Drye makes clear that recourse to state law is appropriate 
for only one purpose, to identify which strings, powers, or controls the tax 
delinquent has as to the assets out of which the Service seeks to effect 
collection. Once that has been done, recourse to state law ends and all 
further matters are governed exclusively by federal law. Thus, whether the 
identified strings, powers, or controls rise to the level of being property or 
rights to property under section 6321 is purely a question offederal law.28 
Similarly, what steps the Service can take against the property after 
attachment of the tax lien and what defenses or protections the taxpayer or 
third parties may have against those steps are purely questions of federal 
law. 
Another aspect of Drye is its reaffirmation that state-created fictions do 
not control or limit the federal tax lien. It is fundamental that, in general, 
substance controls over form in federal taxation.29 Thus, fictions -labels 
that diverge from underlying substance or reality-are not controlling or 
even relevant. 30 Drye adhered to that approach. The Court disregarded the 
state law fiction that Mr. Drye predeceased his mother. 31 Instead, the Court 
focused on the reality of Mr. Drye's control over the property. Ifhe did not 
27 Drye, 528 U.S. at 52. 
28 See id. at 56 (confirming previous case law that these statutory terms have an 
expansive meaning); see also supra text accompanying notes 10-11. Drye also distilled 
prior cases to develop an illustrative, but not comprehensive list of factors or criteria useful 
in deciding whether the powers possessed constitute section 6321 property or property 
rights. Drye, 528 U.S. at 56-61; see Johnson III, supra note 23, at 422-24. 
29 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604-05 (1948); Gregory v. Helvering, 
293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935); Speca v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1980). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 239-40 (1994); United States v. 
Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 369 (1939). 
31 See Drye, 528 U.S. at 59. 
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disclaim, he would get the property; if he did disclaim, his act would 
channel the property to his daughter. He had the power to direct where the 
property would go. That was enough to give him a property right for 
section 6321 purposes. 32 
B. Craft 
Craft is the first case after Drye in which the Court tested the role of 
state law in federal tax lien analysis. In fact, much of the drama in Craft 
involved whether the Court would adhere to its salutary clarification in 
Drye or would undercut it, returning us to the pre-Drye muddle. Fortu-
nately, the Court took the first course. 
Despite the expansive reading generally given to section 6321, for a 
long time an anomaly existed with respect to a tax delinquent's interests in 
tenancy-by-the-entirety property. In its original conception, this tenancy 
was based on a fiction: the notion that, by virtue of marriage, the husband 
and especially, the wife had lost their separate identities and became one 
person in law.33 The fiction reflected "a particularly difficult form of 
doublethink,"34 and many states abolished tenancy by the entirety as a form 
of ownership.35 
Many American jurisdictions still recognize the form of tenancy by the 
entirety, although significant differences in detail exist. The important 
difference, for present purposes, involves the extent to which creditors can 
32 See id. at 60-61. 
33 See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 3 70 (1939) ("A tenancy by the entirety 
'is essentially a joint tenancy, modified by the common law theory that husband and wife 
are one person.' Only a fiction stands between the two.") (internal citations omitted); 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 182 ( 1766). 
34 John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law 
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 40 (1997). Specifically, 
[a ]!though Blackstone elsewhere categorically declared that during marriage "the 
very being and existence of the woman is suspended," he could not consistently 
maintain that legal fiction, as he himself candidly admitted. "[N]either the 
husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the other," he 
said of the tenancy by the entirety. She may have been a nonperson in some 
sense, but for a sale her separate assent was required. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
35 Even England, where it originated, abolished that form of ownership in 1925. Law 
of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 37 (1925) (Eng.). See RICHARD R. 
POWELL, 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ii 620 [3] (Patrick J. Rohan rev. ed. 1993) (noting 
that a number of American jurisdictions never adopted it or, especially under the influence 
of the Married Women's Property Acts, abolished or restricted it). 
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proceed against entireties property to collect separate debts of one of the 
spouses. The following discussion focuses on two patterns of state law, 
which I call, respectively, the "partial bar" and the "full bar" jurisdictions.36 
There are approximately ten partial bar jurisdictions. In these 
jurisdictions, the liens of separate creditors can attach, but are subject to the 
rights of the other spouse.37 This means that the underlying property 
cannot be levied on until the entireties estate ends. For example, divorce 
converts an entireties estate into a tenancy in common,38 which would 
allow the separate creditor to proceed against the debtor's now separate 
interest. Or, death of one spouse leaves the survivor as the sole, fee simple 
owner of the property.39 Therefore, if the debtor spouse is the survivor, the 
creditor may act against the whole property; however, if the nondebtor 
spouse is the survivor, the creditor is left without recourse. 
There are approximately sixteen full bar jurisdictions. In these 
jurisdictions, separate creditors have even less recourse. Their liens do not 
attach at all to, and they may not levy on, entireties property or interests.40 
The extent to which the federal tax lien attaches to entireties property 
or interests first was litigated generations ago,41 before Drye's clarification 
of the limited role of state law in federal tax lien analysis. The early cases 
followed the state rules, importing them into the tax lien area. Subsequent 
cases typically followed suit. There were numerous such decisions,42 and 
only a few discordant notes.43 
Thus, before Craft, the view of the lower courts was that the attach-
36 For a listing of jurisdictions in these categories and for a fuller description, see 
Johnson I, supra note 2, at 843-44; Johnson II, supra note 2, at 1169-70. 
37 See, e.g., In re Pletz, 225 B.R. 206, 208 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) ("The interest of a 
judgment debtor, as tenant by the entirety with his wife, may be sold on execution .... The 
execution purchaser only obtains the debtor spouse's interest, which ceases to exist should 
the debtor spouse predecease the nondebtor spouse.") (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted), a.ff'd, 234 B.R. 800 (D. Or. 1998), ajf'd, 221 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). 
38 See, e.g., Sebold v. Sebold, 444 F.2d 864, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
39 See, e.g., United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1990). 
40 See, e.g., Sanford v. Bertrau, 169 N.W. 2d 880, 881 (Mich. 1918). 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951); Shaw v. United 
States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Mich. 1939); Smith v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 807, 811-13 
(1931). 
42 See, e.g., Benson v. United States, 442 F.2d 1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Batrus, 
Foldenauer & Madigan, Inc. v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 'IJ 72-629 (E.D. Va. 
1972); Pettingill v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D. Vt. 1962). 
43 See Johnson I, supra note 2, at 877-81 (discussing pre-Craft cases disagreeing or in 
tension with the old view). 
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ment of the federal tax lien to entireties interests and property depended on 
the content of state law. Under the pre-Craft view: (1) ifthe spouses were 
jointly liable for the unpaid tax,44 the tax lien attached because under state 
law, entireties property is answerable for joint debts;45 (2) if only one 
spouse was liable in a partial bar state, the tax lien attached to that spouse's 
interest subject to the other spouse's interest;46 (3) if only one spouse was 
liable in a full bar state, the tax lien attached to nothing.47 
However, the Court never embraced the pre-Craft view. Although the 
Court did not directly address the issue of the attachment of the federal tax 
lien to entireties property until Craft, dicta in a 1983 decision cast doubt on 
the pre-Craft view,48 and the pre-Craft view seemed hard to reconcile with 
several decisions of the Court. 49 
The Court's chance to address the issue squarely came in Craft. 50 Don 
and Sandra Craft lived in Michigan, a full bar state, and owned a parcel of 
land there as tenants by the entireties. Don, an attorney, failed to file 
income tax returns for 1979 through 1986, causing unpaid assessments of 
44 The main situation of joint liability involves the spouses filing a joint income tax 
return for the year. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994). Even then, liability would not be joint 
to the extent the spousal relief rules applied. See id. § 6015 (2000); id. § 6013(e) (1997) 
(repealed 1998). Joint liability could exist in other situations too. For example, the Service 
might have made "responsible person" assessments against both spouses for unpaid trust 
fund employment taxes if both met the criteria of section 6672. 
45 See, e.g., Tony Thornton Auction Serv., Inc. v. United States, 791F.2d635, 637-38 
(8th Cir. 1986); Whitaker v. Kavanagh, JOO F. Supp. 918, 920 (E.D. Mich. 1951); United 
States v. Eglinton, 90-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ii 50,322 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
46 See, e.g., Geiselman v. United States, 961 F.2d I, 6-7 (!st Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 916-17 (D.N.J. 1995); United States v. Brynes, 848 F. Supp. 
1096, 1099 (D.R.I. 1994). 
47 See, e.g., Cole v. Cardoza, 441F.2d1337, 1343-44 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Am. Nat'! Bank, 255 F.2d 504, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied as to another issue, 358 
U.S. 835 (1959); Masonry Prods., Inc. v. Tees, 280 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.V.I. 1968). 
48 United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 703 n.31 (1983). Counsel for taxpayers in 
Rodgers and a leading commentator remarked that in view of Rodgers, "perhaps it is only 
a matter of time" before the overthrow of the pre-Craft view. WILLIAM D. ELLIOTT, 
FEDERAL TAX COLLECTIONS, LIENS & LEVIES ii 9.09[4][d] (2d ed. 1995); Terrence c. 
Brown-Steiner, Comment, The Aftermath of United States v. Rodgers, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 
297, 323 (1985) ("A strong argument can be made that Rodgers does apply to tenancy-by-
the-entirety situations."); see also John F. Hernandez, The Federal Tax Lien: Beyond United 
States v. Rodgers, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (1984) ("Clearly, a literal reading of 
section 7403 would invade the tenancy by the entirety sanctuary."). 
49 See Johnson I, supra note 2, at 868-76 (discussing Rodgers and National Bank of 
Commerce, among other cases). 
so The facts recited herein are drawn from Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1419-20. 
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nearly a half million dollars against him, but not Sandra, for those years. 
When the Service filed notices of tax lien against Don, the Crafts 
quitclaimed the parcel into Sandra's sole ownership. The Service asserted 
that the conveyance was fraudulent. 
Later, Sandra wished to sell the parcel. The Service agreed to 
discharge the parcel from the liens against Don,51 subject to the sale 
proceeds being held in escrow pending determination of whether the tax 
lien attached to part of the proceeds. 
Several rounds of litigation ensued. Despite some support for the 
Service's position,52 the Sixth Circuit ultimately followed the pre-Craft 
view, holding that the tax lien did not attach to any part of the sale 
proceeds.53 By a six-to-three vote, the Court reversed, overthrowing the 
pre-Craft view.54 
The main thrust of the Court's decision is the inconsistency of the pre-
Craft view with Drye. The Court followed its holding in Drye that state 
law is consulted only to identify which powers, strings, or controls the tax 
delinquent has as to the asset in question and thereafter, state law is 
irrelevant. 55 
Thus, state law performs two functions: identification and characteriza-
51 See I.R.C. § 6325(b)(3) (1994). 
52 The original decision of the district court granted summary judgment to the Service, 
awarding the Service half of the sale proceeds. See Craft v. United States, 94-2 U.S.T.C. 
(CCH) iJ 50,493 (W.D. Mich. 1994), supplemental opinion 1995 WL 549317 (W.D. Mich. 
1995). A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, see 140 F.3d 638 
(6th Cir. 1998). One of the judges, though, concurred only on the ground that because 
material issues of fact existed, summary judgment was not appropriate. He expressed his 
belief that the pre-Craft rule was inconsistent with Court and other precedents. Id. at 645-
49 (Ryan, J., concurring). The final opinion of the Sixth Circuit was by another three-judge 
panel, see 233 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2000), rev 'd, 122 S. Ct. 1414. Again, one judge concurred 
on law-of-the-case grounds, but expressed his belief that the pre-Craft rule no longer was 
good law. Id. at 376-77 (Gilman, J., concurring). 
53 For a critique of the Sixth Circuit's decision, see Johnson Ill, supra note 23, at 445-
52. 
54 Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. Justice Scalia wrote a short dissent, which 
is discussed in subpart IV.B. infra. Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia, 
wrote a longer dissent, which is discussed in subpart III.B., infra. 
55 "Whether the interests of [Don] in the property he held as a tenant by the entirety 
constitutes [sic] 'property and rights to property' for the purposes of. .. 6321, is ultimately 
a question of federal law." Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1420. Strangely, and without support, the 
three dissenters thought that under Drye, characterization-whether the powers do or do not 
rise to the level of being section 6321 property rights-is a matter of state law. See id. at 
1428, 1432. 
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ti on. 
(1) Identification: The Court looked to Michigan law to ascertain what 
powers Don had as to the parcel. 
According to Michigan law, [Don] had, among other rights, the 
following rights with respect to the entireties property: the right to 
use the property, the right to exclude third parties from it, the right 
to a share of income produced from it, the right of survivorship, 
the right to become a tenant in common with equal shares upon 
divorce, the right to sell the property with [Sandra's] consent and 
to receive half the proceeds from such a sale, the right to place an 
encumbrance on the property with [Sandra's] consent, and the right 
to block [Sandra] from selling or encumbering the property 
unilaterally. 56 
(2) Characterization: Under the characterization made by state law, 
Don had no interest in the parcel. "Following Blackstone, Michigan 
characterizes its tenancy by the entirety as creating no individual rights 
whatsoever."57 But that characterization under state law clearly is a fiction, 
as the above enumeration of Don's powers reveals. Following Drye, Craft 
rejected the relevance of state law fictions. 58 
Indeed, the fiction under state law is hard to swallow. As the Court 
noted, Sandra "had no more interest in the property than [Don]; if neither 
of them had a property interest in the entireties property, who did?"59 The 
Court properly labeled this result absurd and noted its potential to facilitate 
abuse of the tax system. 60 
Fortunately, we are not compelled to endure either logical contortion or 
tax abuse. Whatever their nature, state law characterizations are not 
germane to the section 6321 characterization. As the Court observed, 
following Drye: 
In looking to state law, we must be careful to consider the 
substance of the rights state law provides, not merely the labels the 
56 Id. at 1422. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. at 1421. 
59 Id. at 1424. 
60 See id. For a description of how entireties ownership could be used, before Craft, 
as a key component of a scheme of tax avoidance, see Steve R. Johnson, After Craft: 
Implementation Issues, 96 TAX NOTES 553, 556 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson IV]. See also 
Craft, 140 F.3d at 649 (Ryan, J., concurring). 
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State gives these rights or the conclusions it draws from them. 
Such state law labels are irrelevant to the federal question of which 
bundles of rights constitute property that may be attached by a 
federal tax lien.61 
So, irrespective of Michigan's characterization, did the bundle of 
powers Don had as a tenant by the entireties constitute property or property 
rights for section 6321 purposes? The Court said "yes." Its reasoning 
proceeded as follows: 
First, the Court noted approvingly the previous case law62 reading the 
language of section 6321 as sweeping.63 
Second, the Court focused on Don's present powers regarding the 
parcel. The Court noted his right to use the parcel, to receive income 
produced by it, and to exclude third parties from it, calling these rights 
"some of the most essential property rights,"64 a conclusion amply 
supported by the Court's previous decisions.65 The Court stated: "These 
rights alone may be sufficient to subject [Don's] interest in the entireties 
property to the federal tax lien. They gave him a substantial degree of 
control over the entireties property."66 That is significant because "as [the 
Court] noted in Drye, in determining whether a federal taxpayer's state-law 
rights constitute property or rights to property, the important consideration 
is the breadth of the control the taxpayer could exercise over the 
property. ,,61 
Third, the Court noted that Don also had the right to alienate or 
encumber the property with Sandra's consent. The fact that he could not 
61 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1420. 
62 See supra text accompanying notes I 0-11. 
63 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422-23. 
64 Id. at 1423. 
65 The Court cited Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) ("[T]he right to 
exclude others [is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property"'), Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 
(1979), and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
The Court also could have cited Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984), 
a leading gift tax decision. ("We have little difficulty accepting the theory that the use of 
valuable property ... is itself a legally protectible property interest."). See also Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 890 (2000) 
(examining cases considering the meaning of"property" under the Due Process Clause and 
the Takings Clause). 
66 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1423. 
67 Id. (quoting Drye, 528 U.S. at 61) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
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unilaterally alienate the property was relevant to the characterization, but 
not sufficient to remove Don's bundle of powers from the category of 
property rights described in section 6321.68 That conclusion69 was 
supported by the fact that cases already had established that the tax lien 
attaches to other types of interests that are not unilaterally alienable, such 
as interests in homesteads, 70 community property, 71 and spendthrift trusts. 72 
Drye had been to the same effect, 73 and other bodies of law could be 
enlisted in support of the same conclusion. 74 
The Court seems to have found the characterization question an easy 
call. Once characterization is understood as a federal question, as Drye 
teaches it must be, the powers, strings, and controls that each entireties 
tenant possesses, when taken in the aggregate, easily rise to the level of 
property or property rights for section 6321 purposes. 75 
Fourth, the Court rejected the relevance of state law restrictions on 
creditors of entireties spouses. The Court noted that the fact that Michigan 
law does not permit separate creditors to proceed against entireties property 
or interests 
by no means dictates [the Court's] choice. The interpretation of26 
U.S.C. § 6321 is a federal question, and in answering that question 
[the Court is] in no way bound by state courts' answers to similar 
questions involving state law. As [the Court] elsewhere has held, 
68 See id. at 1423 (stating "[t]here is no reason to believe ... that this one stick ... is 
essential."). 
69 See id. at 1423-24. 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 684 (1983). 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1970). 
72 See, e.g., Bank One Ohio Trust Co., N.A. v. United States, 80 F.3d 173, 176 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
73 Drye, 528 U.S. at 60 n.7 (stating that transferability may not be essential to the 
existence of property rights under section 6321 ). 
74 For example, "[r]ights which are not ordinarily exchanged or exchangeable are 
included in the [bankruptcy] estate." Robert B. Chapman, Coverture and Cooperation: The 
Firm, the Market, and the Substantive Consolidation of Married Debtors, 17 BANKR. DEV. 
J. 105, 127 (2000). 
75 The fact that each tenant's present rights sufficed to answer the characterization 
question in the affirmative meant that the Court did not have to decide how much the future 
rights, such as the right of survivorship, added to the mix. See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1424. 
Whether such rights, standing on their own, constitute section 6321 property rights may 
depend on whether they are seen as contingent rights (which probably are within section 
6321) or merely as expectancies (which may not be). See Johnson III, supra note 23, at 
422-23. 
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exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector.76 
Doctrinally, the Court's decision in Craft clearly is correct. A contrary 
holding could not have been squared with Drye; indeed, it would have 
remuddied the waters Drye clarified. When disquiet is expressed about 
Craft, it usually is not on doctrinal grounds. Rather, the concerns relate 
more to policy, principally the effect of the decision on federalism and on 
nondebtor spouses. As described in Parts III and IV respectively, these 
concerns can be answered. 
Ill. CRAFT AND FEDERALISM 
As Drye was foundational in Part II, another Court precedent is 
foundational in Part III: the 1983 decision in United States v. Rodgers.77 
Below, we consider Rodgers first, then explore the federalism implications, 
if any, of Craft. 
A. Rodgers 
Rodgers involved two consolidated cases presenting the same legal 
issue.78 For simplicity, we will note the facts of only one of the cases.79 
Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers and her then-husband acquired a residence in 
Texas, which they occupied as a homestead. In 1971 and 1972, the Service 
assessed nearly a million dollars of wagering taxes, interest, and penalties 
against the husband. The husband's debts remained unpaid as of his death 
in 1974. Lucille owed no tax. 
After her husband's death, Lucille continued to occupy the residence as 
her homestead, with a new husband. In 1977, the Government brought suit 
under section 7 403 to enforce the tax lien against the homestead property. 80 
76 122 S. Ct. at 1425-26 (quoting Drye, 528 U.S. at 51, and citing Rodgers, 461 U.S. 
at 701) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 461 U.S. 677 (1983). 
78 See United States v. Rogers [sic], 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981 ), rev' d, 461 U.S. 677 
(1983), and Ingram v. Dallas Dep't of Hous. & Urban Rehab., 649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 
1981), vacated, 461 U.S. 677 (1983). The taxpayer's name was misspelled in the caption 
of the first of these cases. 
79 The recited facts are from 461 U.S. at 687-88. 
80 Section 7403 was crafted to deal with situations in which both the tax delinquent and 
one or more third parties hold interests in property. It permits the Service to petition a 
federal district court to sell the whole of the property, then to distribute the net proceeds of 
the sale among the various interestholders, with the Service standing in the delinquent's 
shoes to the extent of the unpaid taxes. See I.R.C. § 7403(a), (b). This device is discussed 
further in subpart IV.B. infra. 
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The Court held that the property could be sold under section 7403. 81 
Because section 7403 operates only when the tax lien is in place, this 
holding means that the federal tax lien attached to Lucille's deceased 
husband's interest in the homestead property. 82 
For our purposes, it is particularly striking that Texas law-indeed the 
state constitution--established a formidable set of protections for 
homestead property. Specifically: 
(1) With exceptions not here relevant, Texas homesteads were 
"protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts . . . . No 
mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid. "83 
(2) "[T]he owner or claimant of the property ... [may not], if married, 
sell or abandon the homestead without the consent of the other 
spouse. . . . "84 
(3) Upon the death of the first spouse, the homestead property "shall 
not be partitioned among the heirs of the deceased during the lifetime of the 
surviving husband or wife, or so long as the survivor may elect to use or 
occupy the same as a homestead."85 
For state law purposes, these provisions operated in two directions. 
One is that these laws confer a mere privilege of exemption, which 
operates to prevent the use of the process of the court to sell certain 
property for the payment of debts. The other is that the homestead 
right is considered an estate in land vested in the person designated 
by law.86 
The Court summarized it as follows: 
The effect of these provisions in the Texas Constitution is to give 
each spouse in a marriage a separate and undivided possessory 
interest in the homestead, which is only lost by death or abandon-
ment, and which may not be compromised either by the other 
81 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 690-703. 
82 Section 7403(a) authorizes a civil action "to enforce the lien of the United States." 
The Court noted: "As a general matter, the 'lien of the United States' referred to in 
§ 7403(a) is that created by [Code]§ 6321." 461 U.S. at 681. 
83 Id. at 684 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50). 
84 Id. at 684-85 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50). 
85 Id. at 685 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 52). 
86 Rogers, 649 F.2dat 1126-27 (quoting Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 19 S.W.2d 35, 
35 (Tex. 1929)); see also Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 686 (stating that the "homestead right is not 
a mere statutory entitlement, but a vested property right."). 
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spouse or by his or her heirs. 87 
Although there are differences in detail,88 Texas homestead interests at 
issue in Rodgers are, for our purpose, comparable in essential nature to the 
full-bar entireties interests at issue in Craft. As the full bar states did, the 
state of Texas created a type of interest in property and imbued it with 
certain characteristics, including strong protections against creditors' 
claims or the actions of the other spouse. We shall return to this similarity 
in evaluating the federalism implications of Craft. 
B. Craft 
A principal complaint of the dissenters in Craft was that the decision 
"ignores the primacy of state law in defining property interests"89 and 
"works a sea change in the role States have traditionally played in 'creating 
and defining' property interests."90 The dissenters also warned that Craft 
"creates a new federal common law of property."91 
I believe that concern is misplaced. First, Craft does not break new 
ground in terms of federal/state relations. The case travels paths well-
trodden by prior decisions. Second, Craft merely involves a federal 
definition of terms in a federal statute for federal purposes. Defining terms 
in a federal statute for federal purposes is legitimately within the realm of 
the federal government's powers. Craft does not displace the ability of the 
states to define the same terms however they wish for their own nonfederal 
purposes. 
1. Not Groundbreaking 
From the standpoint of federalism, there is no compelling difference 
between Rodgers and Craft. The homestead interests in the former were 
comparable in dignity, authority, purpose, and strength of protection to the 
entireties interests in the latter. And, of course, Rodgers was only one of 
many cases decided before Craft in which the Court and lower courts92 
refused to give effect to state law restrictions and rules for federal tax 
purposes, whether liability or collection-related. Consider the cases 
87 Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 685. 
88 See United States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 919 (D.N.J. 1995), ajf'd without 
opinion, 74 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1995). 
89 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1427 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
91 Jd. 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
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discussed below. 
Mitchell v. United States93 was a consolidated case involving two sets 
of Louisiana taxpayers, the Mitchells and the Sparacios. In the first case,94 
Mr. Mitchell earned a salary, half of which was his and half was his wife's 
under Louisiana community property law. Neither spouse filed federal 
income tax returns, and tax was not paid on the earnings. In 1961, some 
years after the income was earned, Mrs. Mitchell formally renounced the 
community property as part of the Mitchells' divorce. As a result, 
Mrs. Mitchell received neither a distribution of community property nor a 
property settlement on dissolution of the marriage, and instead, she was 
exonerated of "debts contracted during marriage. "95 
The Service determined deficiencies against Mrs. Mitchell based on her 
half of the community income, and it sought to collect the deficiencies out 
of property she had owned and gratuitously transferred. The Fifth Circuit 
held that, by virtue of her state law renunciation, Mrs. Mitchell avoided tax 
liability on the community income.96 The Court unanimously reversed, 
noting that "with respect to community income, as with respect to other 
income, federal income tax liability follows ownership. "97 The Court noted 
that, in determining ownership, "state law creates legal interests but the 
federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed."98 
Mrs. Mitchell argued in part that "her right to renounce the community 
and to place herself in the same position as if it has never existed is 
substantive [and that] ... it is really the community as an entity, not the 
husband or the wife, that owns the property."99 Based on section 6321 and 
related Code sections, 100 though, the Court rejected these arguments, 
noting: 
93 403 U.S. 190 (1971). 
94 These facts are drawn from id. at 191-93. 
95 Id. at 191 (quoting LA. C!v. CODE art. 2410 (1972) (repealed 1980)). 
96 See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 430 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970). 
97 Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 197 (citations omitted). 
98 Id. (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
99 Id. at 203. 
100 See id. at 204-05. The related sections were I.R.C. § 633l(a) (1954) (authorizing 
the Service to levy "upon all property and rights to property" of the tax delinquent) and 
I.R.C. § 6334(c) (1954) ("Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, no property 
or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made 
exempt by [the Code]."). The Court remarked: "This language is specific and it is clear 
[that] there is no room in it for automatic exemption of property that happens to be exempt 
from state levy under state law." Id. at 205. 
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The results urged by the [taxpayers] might follow, of course, 
in connection with a tax or other obligation the collection of which 
is controlled by state law. But an exempt status under state law 
does not bind the federal collector. Federal law governs what is 
exempt from federal levy . 
. . . [S]tate law which exempts a husband's interest in commu-
nity property from his premarital debts does not defeat collection 
of his federal income tax liability for premarital tax years from his 
interest in the community. The result as to [the taxpayers in the 
instant case] is no different. 101 
United States v. Jrvine102 considered whether a transfer subject to the 
federal gift tax resulted from disclaimer of a remainder interest in a trust. 
The taxpayer argued that a Treasury Regulation governing disclaimers was 
inapplicable and, thus, that state law applied. "Under state property rules, 
an effective disclaimer of a testamentary gift is generally treated as relating 
back to the moment of the original transfer of the interest being dis-
claimed. . . . "103 
The Court, in a unanimous decision, rejected that argument. It referred, 
as had the Mitchell court, to "the general and longstanding rule in federal 
tax cases that although state law creates legal interests and rights in 
property, federal law determines whether and to what extent those interests 
will be taxed."104 The Court concluded that "Congress had not meant to 
incorporate state-law fictions as touchstones of taxability when it enacted 
the [statute]. Absent such a legal fiction, the federal gift tax is not struck 
blind by a disclaimer."105 
While Irvine involved fictions arising under state disclaimer rules in 
the tax liability context, Drye involved fictions in the tax collection 
context. The result, though, was the same: a clear and unanimous holding 
that state law rules do not control federal taxation. 106 
Thus, Craft is not radical. Long before that decision, the Court 
repeatedly had held that the federal tax statutes are not controlled by state 
101 Id. at 204-05 (internal citations omitted). 
102 511 U.S. 224 (1994). 
103 Id. at 239 (citations omitted). 
104 Id. at 238. 
105 Id. at 240. See also id. at 239 (noting that "state property transfer rules do not 
translate into federal taxation rules"). 
106 For detailed discussion of Drye, see subpart II.A. supra. 
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property or debtor-creditor rules. As a result, federalism complaints about 
Craft are reminiscent of similar complaints about the prior decisions. For 
instance, just as the dissenters in Craft said that Craft "ignores the primacy 
of state law in defining property interests,"107 a commentator said that Drye 
"reversed the long held belief that state law defines property."108 
The dissenters in Craft, though, found Craft unique and, with respect 
to the history discussed above, noted that: "Drye, like Irvine and Mitchell 
before it, was concerned not with whether state law recognized 'property' 
as belonging to the taxpayer in the first place, but rather with whether state 
laws could disclaim or exempt such property from federal tax liability after 
the property interest was created."109 They read the prior cases as 
establishing a "careful line between state laws that purport to disclaim or 
exempt property interests after the fact, which the federal tax lien does not 
respect, and state laws' definition of property and property rights, which 
the federal tax lien does respect."110 
This distinction is not viable, however. The dissenters read the prior 
cases selectively and invented the distinction, rather than finding it in the 
precedents. The "careful line" of distinction to which the dissenters refer 
is drawn infrequently or not at all in the prior cases. The only cases that 
possibly support the dissenters' position are the 1940 Morgan v. 
Commissioner111 and the 1960 Aquilino v. United States112 decisions. But 
Morgan is internally inconsistent, and the language in both cases is best 
regarded as an imprecise statement of a view compatible with Drye and 
Craft rather than as the statement of a different view. 113 
In addition, the proffered distinction explains the facts of Mitchell, 
Irvine, and Drye, but does not explain the statements of the rule set out in 
those cases. While Mitchell, Irvine, and Drye did involve rights conferred 
by state law, which the taxpayers later renounced or disclaimed, the 
statements in these cases rejecting importation of state limitations and legal 
fictions are sweeping. These statements are not limited solely to "back 
107 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1427 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
108 Comment, Cases, Statutes, and Recent Developments, 33 URB. LAW. 221, 221 
(2001 ). For another commentator arguing that Drye traduces federalism, see Note, Drye v. 
United States: Limiting the Traditional State Right To Define Property, 69 UMKC L. REV. 
909 (2001). 
109 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. 
111 See 309 U.S. 78, 80-82 (1940). 
112 See 363 U.S. 509, 512-14 (1960). 
113 See Johnson III, supra note 23, at 427-30 (discussing these points in detail). 
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end" limitations and fictions. 
Finally, the proffered distinction wholly omits Rodgers. The dissenters 
infer the careful line of distinction only from the above cases and do not 
attempt to fit Rodgers into the distinction. 114 Nor could they. The 
distinction the dissenters off er explains neither the language nor the facts 
of Rodgers. In Rodgers, there was no back-end exemption. The exemption 
of homestead interests from creditors' claims was part and parcel of those 
interests from the outset; indeed, the exemption was central to the state's 
creation of such interests. Similarly, in Rodgers there was no renunciation 
or disclaimer. 
Thus, the dissenters failed to show that Craft was unique in that it 
created federalism concerns not present in prior cases. One can say, of 
course, that multiple wrongs do not make a right. Nonetheless, it is hard to 
think that Craft "works a sea change"115 when it merely navigates waves 
and billows that have felt the same prow before. 
2. Federal Definition for Federal Purposes 
The dissenters in Craft objected that the decision "creates a new federal 
common law ofproperty."116 One answer to that objection is that any such 
creation was the work of Drye, not of Craft. Indeed, considering prior 
cases on the subject, Drye is best understood as a clarification, not a change 
of law. 117 Drye held that whether the bundle of state-created rights 
constitutes section 6321 property or property rights is a matter of federal 
law. 118 Inevitably, that calls into being a federal common law of property, 
for this limited purpose. The Court recognized that when it decided Drye 
because a substantial portion of the Drye opinion consists of the distillation 
of criteria from prior federal cases that bear on the resolution of this federal 
question, i.e., criteria indicative of section 6321 property status. 
The dissenters' objection can be met with an even more fundamental 
answer. Creation of a federal common law of property would be objection-
able if it displaced state property rules in areas traditionally and legiti-
mately within the domain of state authority. Drye, Craft, and prior cases 
do not displace state property law; instead, they apply a federal definition 
114 This omission is all the more striking in light of the heavy emphasis Rodgers 
receives in the majority opinion. See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1423-26. 
115 Id. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. 
117 See Johnson III, supra note 23, at 425-32. 
118 See Drye, 528 U.S. at 52. 
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to a federal enterprise of fundamental federal interest. This act does not 
offend federalism; it respects it. 
In this regard it is significant that: (l) a Court known for its solicitude 
toward the principle offederalism decided Drye unanimously; 119 (2) Justice 
O'Connor wrote the Craft majority opinion; and (3) she along with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy-all numbered among federalism's 
strong advocates on the current Court-constituted half of the six-person 
Craft majority. 
The majority's understanding-that federalism is not traduced by 
federal definitions for purposes of federal revenue laws-has considerable 
support in Court precedents. For example, in an early depreciation case, 
the Court stated: "It does not matter that in Ohio, where the properties lie, 
[a different characterization exists.] The Act of Congress has its own 
criteria, irrespective oflocal law."120 Similarly, the Court instructed in an 
early capital gains case: 
Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application 
of a statute enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary 
power under the Constitution, to tax income. The exertion of that 
power is not subject to state control. It is the will of Congress 
which controls, and the expression of its will in legislation, in the 
absence of language evidencing a different purpose, is to be 
interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a nation-wide 
scheme of taxation. State law may control only when the federal 
taxing act, by express language or necessary implication, makes its 
own operation dependent upon state law. 121 
Many other cases could be cited to the same effect. 122 
In short, there is no breach of federalism when, as Drye, Craft, and 
other cases tell us, the characterization of section 6321 property is treated 
as a federal question. Congress used the word "property" in section 6321 
as part of a federal statute to govern federal revenue collection. The federal 
government is a sovereign, just as the states are sovereigns. Federalism is 
119 See generally Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The 
Proper Textual Basis for the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 
93 NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999). 
120 Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 338 (1929). 
121 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (citations omitted). 
122 See, e.g., Hogan v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1944); Greenough v. 
Comm'r, 74 F.2d 25, 26 (!st Cir. 1934). 
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not undercut when one sovereign defines a word in a particular fashion 
entirely for its own purposes. Nor is federalism undercut when one 
sovereign defines the word differently from how other sovereigns define 
the word for their own, separate purposes. 
IV. CRAFT AND PROTECTION OF NONDEBTOR SPOUSES 
Cases previously discussed are relevant to the issue of the protection of 
the nondebtor spouse as is a case not yet emphasized: United States v. 
National Bank of Commerce, 123 ("NBC"). This part of the Article first 
discusses NBC, then considers whether, in light of NBC and other cases, 
Craft excessively compromises the legitimate interests of entireties spouses 
who do not owe tax. 
A. NBC 
In NBC, the Service had assessed income taxes, interest, and penalties 
against Roy Reeves, but part of the assessments remained unpaid. 124 Roy, 
his wife Neva, and his mother Ruby were the joint holders of two bank 
accounts. The record did not disclose, indeed the parties stipulated that 
they would submit no evidence as to, which of the coholders owned the 
monies in the accounts. Under applicable state (Arkansas) law, each of the 
three coholders had the right to withdraw the full amounts in the accounts 
without notice to or consent by the other coholders. 125 
The Service sought to obtain the funds in the two accounts as part of its 
efforts to collect the unpaid assessments against Roy. The Service served 
a notice of levy on the bank. 126 The bank refused to honor the levy, 
maintaining that it did not know how much of the funds (or, indeed, if any 
part of the funds) belonged to Roy, as opposed to Neva or Ruby. 127 
123 472 U.S. 713 (1985). 
124 All recited facts are drawn from id. at 715-23. 
125 See Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 US. at 723 (citing ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 67-521 
(1980) (repealed 1983), 67-552 (1980) (amended 1983)). An account holder who 
withdraws money that he did not deposit and does not own does not, by virtue of the 
withdrawal, become the owner. See, e.g., Blackv. Black, 135 S.W.2d 837, 841(Ark.1940) 
(stating that the true owner may take legal steps, including suit, to secure the return of her 
money). 
126 See I.R.C. §§ 6331 (a), 6332(a) (2000). 
127 A bank served with notice oflevy from the Service has only two possible defenses 
for failure to comply: ( l) that the funds are subject to judicial execution or attachment prior 
to the levy, or (2) that the bank is not in possession of or obligated with respect to property 
of the tax delinquent. See, e.g., Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820, 824 (9th 
Cir. 1957). The bank's defense in NBC was a variation of the second defense. 
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The Government brought suit against the bank for failure to honor the 
levy. The district court held for the bank on the constitutional ground that 
due process requires "something more than" the post-levy remedies 
available under the Code. 128 Specifically, it concluded, due process 
requires at least that the Service identify the other account holders, notify 
them of the intended levy, and give the account holders a pre-levy 
opportunity to be heard. 129 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, although on 
different grounds. 130 It expressed no opinion on the district court's 
constitutional analysis, but reached the same result as a matter of statutory 
construction. 131 Specifically, the court held that the levy statute, section 
6331, imposes on the Service the burden of proving "the actual value of the 
delinquent taxpayer's interest in jointly owned property,"132 which the 
Service had not done as to the two accounts. Although refusing to allow 
levy on the accounts, both the district court and the circuit court suggested 
that the Government would have been permitted to bring suit133 to foreclose 
the tax lien against the accounts. 134 
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that "Roy could have withdrawn any 
amount he wished from the account and used it to pay his debts, including 
federal income taxes."135 Nonetheless, it rejected the Government's 
contention that the Service stood "in Roy's shoes [to the extent of the 
unpaid liabilities] and could do anything Roy could do."136 This rejection 
was based on state law limits on the remedies available to creditors. Under 
Arkansas garnishment law, "at least . . . ordinary creditors [of a co-
depositor are not] subrogated to that co-owner's power to withdraw the 
entire account."137 Instead, creditors must join all the co-depositors, 
128 See infra subpart IV.B.3 (discussing these remedies). 
129 See United States v. Nat'! Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (E.D. Ark. 
1982). Since 1998, the Code has required notice and opportunity to be heard before the 
Service files a tax lien or makes levy, subject to various limitations. See I.R.C. §§ 6320, 
6330 ~2000). 
1 0 See United States v. Nat'! Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984). 
131 See id. at 1293, 1300. 
132 See id. at 1293. 
133 The Code permits such a suit. See I.R.C. § 7403 (2000). See infra subpart IV.B.3 
(discussing§ 7403). 
134 See Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. at 116; Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 726 
F.2d at 1300. Neva and Ruby would have to be joined in such a suit. See I.R.C. § 7403(b) 
(2000~. 
1 5 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d at 1295. 
136 Id. at 1295-96 (citations omitted). 
137 Id. at 1296. 
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affording them the opportunity to show the extent of their respective 
interests in the account. 138 
By a vote of five to four, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, 
upholding the levy. Many aspects of the Court's opinion inNBCundergird 
positions advanced earlier in this Article. These are noted briefly below. 
1. Reinforcement of Prior Positions 
In NBC the Court reemphasized that the language of section 6321 is 
broad and should be applied that way. 139 It also noted "the need of the 
government promptly to secure its revenues,"140 which explains Congress's 
choice to write the tax collection statutes broadly. 
The Court held that Roy's right to withdraw the funds, even if he did 
not own them, was a property right for section 6331 purposes. 141 
Necessarily, this holding means that it was a section 6321 property right 
too. The Service cannot levy under section 6331 on items to which its 
section 6321 lien does not attach; indeed, the operative language of the two 
sections is identical. 142 
Because the right to withdraw in NBC was property or a right to 
property for federal tax collection purposes, it follows that, as held in Craft, 
entireties interests are as well. Plainly, the right to withdraw money that 
must be returned upon demand by the owner is not a thicker bundle of 
sticks than the powers of an entireties spouse, which include an absolute 
right to occupy or use the property, an absolute right to share in income 
from it, an absolute right to exclude third parties from it, among others. 143 
That being so, NBC foreshadowed, indeed compelled the Craft result. 
In NBC the Court noted as Drye later confirmed, 144 that "whether a 
state-law right constitutes 'property' or 'rights to property' is a matter of 
138 See id. 
139 See Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 719-20. 
140 
Id. at 721 (quoting Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931 )); see also id. at 
733 (f!iuoting Bull, 295 U.S. 247 (1935)); see supra text accompanying note 12. 
1 1 See Nat 'I Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 724. 
142 See l.R.C. § 6321 (2002) (stating that the general federal tax lien attaches to all 
property and rights to property of the tax delinquent); id. § 633 l(a) (stating the Service may 
levy upon all property and rights to property of the tax delinquent); Nat'/ Bank of 
Commerce, 4 72 U.S. at 719 (noting the identity of language in the two sections). 
143 For fuller recitation of the rights of entireties spouses, see Johnson I, supra note 2, 
at 860-61; see also supra text accompanying note 56. 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
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federal law," not state law. 145 In addition, the Court decisively rejected the 
"erroneous assumption that state law dictates the extent of the Govern-
ment's power to levy. It does not. ... " 146 The Eighth Circuit had held that 
because state law provided that an account holder's creditors are not 
subrogated to his right to withdraw, the Service was similarly limited. But 
the Court noted that such an approach "would remit the [Service] to the 
rights only an ordinary creditor would have under state law. That result 
'compare[s] the government to a class of creditors to which it is 
superior'. "147 State law is used only to identify the powers possessed by the 
tax debtor as to the property. Beyond that, state law is irrelevant. 148 
2. Protection of Other Owners or Interest-Holders 
For purposes of part IV, the greater significance of NBC lies in its 
instruction as to the rights of, and protections for, those persons who hold 
interests in property along with a tax delinquent, but do not owe tax. In 
NBC, Ruby and Neva were such persons; in entireties cases, the nondebtor 
spouses are such persons. 
NBC teaches the following: ( 1) the remedies available to the nondebtor 
co-owner are important and must be examined; (2) such remedies may be 
seen as adequate even if they entail some inconvenience, burden, or risk to 
the co-owner; and (3) a balancing of the respective interests of the 
Government and the co-owner is required. These aspects are discussed 
below. 
First, central to the Court's decision in NBC was the fact that 
administrative levy under section 6331 is only a provisional measure. It 
"settles no rights in the property subject to seizure."149 Unlike a lien 
foreclosure suit under section 7403, "levy does not determine whether the 
Government's rights to the seized property are superior to those of other 
claimants."150 
What if Ruby or Neva were the true owner of the funds in the 
accounts? An administrative remedy is available. After levy, they would 
145 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 727 (citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 
51, 56-57 (1958)); see also Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 724 n.8. 
146 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 725 n.9. 
147 Id. at 727 (quoting Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 274 n.8 (5th Cir. 
1976p. 
48 See id. at 726. 
149 United States v. New England Merchants Nat'! Bank, 465 F. Supp. 83, 87 (D. 
Mass. 1979). 
150 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 721. 
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have the opportunity to establish their ownership and thus, to secure return 
of the funds from the Service. If the Service "determines that property has 
been wrongfully levied upon," it has authority to return to the owner, in the 
case of cash, "an amount of money equal to the amount of money levied 
upon" or, in the case of non cash property, the specific property itself or an 
amount equal to what the Service got by selling it. 151 The Court viewed 
this as "an effective and inexpensive administrative remedy" for the true 
owner. 152 
In addition, should the administrative remedy prove unavailing, a 
judicial remedy exists. "If a levy has been made on property or property 
has been sold pursuant to a levy, any person [other than the tax delinquent] 
who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property 
was wrongfully levied upon" may sue the Government in federal district 
court. 153 The prevailing plaintiff would receive, as appropriate, an 
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the levy or sale of the property,154 
return of the specific property, judgment for the amount of money levied 
on, or judgment for the greater of what the Service got from the sale or the 
fair market value of the property immediately before levy. 155 The 
prevailing plaintiff also may recover interest. 156 
Thus, a section 6331 levy is only provisional and does not finally 
determine rights to the property. In upholding such levy, the Court 
examined the subsequent remedies available to interest-holders other than 
the tax delinquent. 
Second, the Court determined that the administrative and judicial 
remedies after levy are sufficient, even though the remedies subject the 
nondebtor co-owners to some inconvenience and risk. Notice need not be 
given (other than to the tax delinquent) of the fact of seizure, 157 and both 
the administrative and judicial requests for review must be begun within 
nine months of the levy. 158 The NBC dissenters argued these points with 
considerable force: 
151 1.R.C. § 6343(b) (2002). 
152 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 728. 
153 1.R.C. § 7426(a)(l) (2002). 
154 See id. § 7426(b )(1) (granted if "a levy or sale would irreparably injure rights in 
property which the court determines to be superior to rights of the United States in [the] 
propeW'"). 
15 See id. § 7426(b)(2). 
156 See id. § 7426(g). 
157 See 472 U.S. at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
158 See I.R.C. §§ 6343(b), 6532(c)(l) (2000). 
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[O]ne would hardly characterize as "provisional" the Govern-
ment's taking of an innocent party's property without notice, 
especially when, even if the taking is discovered, the burden is 
then on the innocent party to institute recovery proceedings. 
Furthermore, absent notice of any kind, the nine months that the . 
. . remedies ordinarily give third parties to contest a levy is a short 
time indeed. There is no certainty that within this time they will 
discover that their property has been used to pay someone else's 
taxes. 159 
Thus, what matters is that the nondebtor co-owners have recourse to 
vindicate their interest. That they bear some cost or burden of vigilance is 
not controlling-those are normal incidents of our legal system. 
Third, the implication of the foregoing is that the adequacy of the 
system is determined by a balancing of interests. Moreover, when 
Congress has effected a balance through its statutory arrangements, that 
balance is entitled to considerable deference. The NBC Court taught: 
Congress thus balanced the interest of the Government in the 
speedy collection of taxes against the interests of any claimants to 
the property, and reconciled those interests by permitting the IRS 
to levy on the assets at once, leaving ownership disputes to be 
resolved in a postseizure administrative or judicial proceeding. Its 
decision that certain property rights must yield provisionally to 
governmental need should not have been disregarded by the Court 
of Appeals. 160 
B. Craft 
Craft raises the question as to whether permitting the tax lien to attach 
to the debtor spouse's interest will unduly compromise the rights and 
legitimate interests of the nondebtor spouse in the entireties property. Fear 
of such a result was one of the reasons early courts barred the liens. 161 In 
fact, this fear-with a gender spin-prompted Justice Scalia's separate 
dissent in Craft. He said: 
[T]he Court nullifies (insofar as federal taxes are concerned, at 
least) a form of property ownership that was of particular benefit 
159 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 747 (citations omitted). 
160 Id. at 729 (citations omitted). 
161 See, e.g., Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1952). 
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to the stay-at-home spouse or mother. She is overwhelmingly 
likely to be the survivor that obtains title to the unencumbered 
property; and she (as opposed to her business-world husband) is 
overwhelmingly unlikely to be the source of the individual 
indebtedness against which a tenancy by the entirety protects. It is 
regrettable that the Court has eliminated a large part of this 
traditional protection retained by many States. 162 
Some will think the model of social roles and relations Justice Scalia 
wants to protect to be of diminishing relevance in contemporary society. 
In my view, the injection of gender effects is unnecessary. If Craft truly 
did compromise legitimate interests of nondebtor spouses, that would be a 
grave deficiency, regardless of whether those spouses were mostly 
husbands or mostly wives. 
Reasonable protection of nondebtor spouses should be a principal 
objective as Craft is implemented administratively and judicially. 
Collecting one person's tax liabilities out of another person's assets would 
be fundamentally unfair even if those persons are married to each other. 
Indeed, doing so would raise substantial questions of due process. 163 
However, Craft poses little danger of oppressing nondebtor spouses. 
I say this for the following three reasons: (1) Craft poses no risks beyond 
those already found acceptable in other contexts; (2) the mere attachment 
of the lien does not harm nondebtor spouses; and (3) realistic post-lien-
attachment options contain ample protections for nondebtor spouses. 
1. Uniqueness 
The same fact noted as to the federalism concern operates here as well. 
Craft entails no danger to non-liable co-owners that is unique in either kind 
or degree. While the same concerns exist in other contexts, they have been 
deemed acceptable or shown to be exaggerated. 
In NBC, 164 the dissenters warned that "the Court's decision [to allow 
the Service to levy on joint accounts] often will place the property rights of 
third parties in serious jeopardy. " 165 Indeed, NBC arguably poses a greater 
risk to third parties than Craft. 166 The Court properly was undeterred by 
162 Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
163 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697. 
164 See supra subpart IV.A. 
165 Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 748. 
166 Two reasons support this statement. In NBC, the debtor (Roy) may not have had 
any beneficial ownership interest in the funds in the accounts. In contrast, in Craft, and in 
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that risk in NBC because the system provides substantial protections and 
remedies for aggrieved co-owners. As indicated below, that same situation 
pertains as to nondebtor spouses in entireties estates. 167 
In Rodgers, the Court permitted the Service to seek judicial sale of 
homestead property under section 7403. 168 As with NBC, Rodgers arguably 
poses a greater risk to third parties than Craft. 169 The Court concluded that 
the concerns were alleviated by the formidable safeguards section 7403 
contains to protect non debtor co-owners of property. 170 We will see that 
section 7403 will be the mechanism that the Service uses in entireties cases 
too, if it seeks to go beyond mere attachment of the lien. Thus, these same 
formidable safeguards will protect entireties spouses. 171 
Moreover, before Craft, entireties estates were the only kind of 
concurrent or marital estates immune from the federal tax lien. In addition 
to homestead interests, the lien attached to community property, 172 property 
subject to dower interests, 173 joint tenancies, 174 tenancies in common, 175 and 
partnerships. 176 And while some of such interests are unilaterally alienable, 
with or without partition, others, including homestead interests177 and, in 
every other entireties case, the debtor spouse clearly has substantial beneficial interest in the 
property, whatever state law fictions may say. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
Second, NBC authorized a more substantial collection step, levy, than the mere lien 
attachment authorized by Craft. 
167 See infra subpart IV.B.3. 
168 See supra subpart III.A. 
169 The homestead is the marital residence, the physical core of the union. In contrast, 
entireties estates can hold a much wider array of assets, not just property specially related 
to the marital relationship. Thus, nonresidential real property (such as land held as an 
investment) as well as, in most entireties jurisdictions, personal property (whether used 
inside or outside the home) may be held by the entireties. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, 
281 U.S. 497, 500 (1930); Winters v. Park, 91 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1956). Thus, every 
property affected by Rodgers, but not every property affected by Craft, is of fundamental 
importance to the nondebtor spouse and the marital union. 
170 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 699. 
171 See infra subpart IV.B.3. 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1970). 
173 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1968). 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1964). 
175 See, e.g., United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1972). 
176 See, e.g., Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1424. Although the Service may not execute on the 
partnership's property, the Service is entitled to "the profits to which the [tax debtor] 
partner would otherwise be entitled," including operating distributions and distribution 
proceeds. Id. (quoting UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 27(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 332 (2001)); see also 
Rev. Rul. 73-24, 1973-1 C.B. 602 (suggesting receivables are subject to levy). 
177 See supra subpart III.A. 
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some states, community property interests are not. 178 
Accordingly, Craft has not cast us into uncharted seas. Most of the 
property owned by spouses in this country is and has been held in forms 
permitting attachment of the tax lien to the interest of one spouse when 
only that spouse owes tax. Craft simply ends an anomaly. Nondebtor 
spouses have been adequately protected in those contexts. They can be 
here as well. 
2. Mere Lien Attachment Not Threatening 
Craft by itself is not threatening. Craft held only that the tax lien 
attaches to entireties property. Mere attachment of the lien does not imperil 
substantial interests of the nondebtor spouse. Nondebtor spouses can 
continue to occupy or use the property, receive their shares of income 
produced by it, exclude third parties from it, and the like. Moreover, the 
nondebtor spouse's contingent rights would be preserved. In the event of 
divorce, the nondebtor spouse would receive a tenancy-in-common interest 
just as before the lien attached. If the debtor spouse died first with the 
marriage intact, the nondebtor's survivorship interests would ripen into fee 
simple ownership of the whole property, just as before the lien attached. 179 
As a practical matter, the couple could not sell the property once the 
lien attached. After the Service files notice of the tax lien, a purchaser or 
grantee takes the property subject to that lien. 180 As a result, the property 
would be effectively unsaleable. But that is no substantial circumscription 
of rights. The nondebtor spouse could not unilaterally alienate the property 
or her interests in it even before the lien attached. She needed the consent 
of the other spouse. After lien attachment, she would, in effect, need the 
consent of the Service, which would stand in the shoes of the debtor 
spouse. 181 
Thus, Craft would not harm the nondebtor spouse if the Service simply 
allowed the lien to attach without taking further enforced collection action. 
178 See Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1423-24. 
179 The Service's lien then would be extinguished. The end of the debtor's interest 
would be the end of the lien as well. See, e.g., United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 
U.S. 522, 526 (1960). 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Hughe!, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
181 The mechanism would be agreement between the couple and the Service under 
which the Service would agree to discharge the property from the lien (so that the property 
~~~~~h~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
lesser of the unpaid liabilities or the value of the debtor spouse's interest in the property. 
See I.R.C § 6325(b)(3) (2000). 
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How likely would it be that the Service would so forebear? Quite likely in 
many, though not all, cases. 182 
The Service makes levies, seizures, and sales in the distinct minority 
of unpaid assessment cases, 183 for a variety of reasons, which are set forth 
below. In some cases, the liability may be too small, or the taxpayer's 
interest worth too little to warrant the effort and expense of levy or sale. 184 
In other cases, the Service may determine that the hardship to the taxpayer 
outweighs the benefit to the Government. 185 And in others, the revenue 
officer may feel that, on the particular facts of the case, there would be an 
excessive public relations risk to the Service186 or personal career risk to the 
officer from aggressive collection. 187 Finally, in an increasing number of 
cases, there simply are not enough revenue officers to handle all, or even 
most, of the collection cases in the queue. 188 
Thus, the Service most likely will stop at lien attachment in many 
entireties cases. Indeed, counsel for the Government suggested this during 
182 The nondebtor spouse's legitimate interests would not be unduly compromised 
even when the Service did proceed to enforced collection. See infra subpart IV.B.3. 
183 For statistics reflecting the "broad decline in enforcement activity," IRS 
OVERSIGHT BOARD ANNUAL REPORT 2 (Jan. 2002), see id. Table 2, and Joint Comm. on 
Tax'n, REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE REFORM AND RESTRUC-
TURING ACT OF 1998, Sec. 134 (May l, 2000). 
184 Cf I.R.C. § 6325(b)(2)(B) (2000) (allowing the Service to discharge property from 
the tax lien when the interest of the United States is valueless). 
185 Cf id. § 6334(a), (d), (e) (making certain types of property exempt from levy, 
reflecting hardship considerations). 
186 The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 was enacted 
because of sensationalistic (though ultimately unsubstantiated) complaints of Service abuse 
during Senate hearings. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, A Residual Damages Right Against the 
IRS: A Cure Worse than the Disease, 88 TAX NOTES 395, 398-99 (2000); Leandra 
Lederman, Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy, 87 TAX NOTES 113, 1136 
(200~h The so-called "1 O deadly sins" provision of the 1998 Act provides for the firing of 
Service agents and officers deemed to have engaged in abuse and misconduct. See Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1203, 112 
Stat. 683, 720-21 (1998). Predictably, this has led to major declines in collection activity. 
See, e~., George Guttman, Rossotti 's Report Card, 94 TAX NOTES 1584, 1585 (2002). 
1 Underfunding leads to inadequate staffing, and underenforcement in both collection 
and examination. This has plagued American tax administration for decades and continues 
to do so today. See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR COLLECTING 
TAXES?: FINANCING THE IRS 69-70 (1986); Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz & Louis 
L. Wilde, The Changing Face of Tax Enforcement, 43 TAX LAW. 893, 912-14 (1990); 
George Guttman, IRS Faces Budget Crunch, 95 TAX NOTES 1546, 1546 (2002). 
470 37 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 
the oral argument of Craft. 189 That remark does not bind the Service, of 
course. Still, at least three reasons explain why this prediction is likely to 
be correct. 
First, enforced collection in entireties cases will be expensive for the 
Service. Revenue officers usually prefer to proceed via levy or seizure 
followed, in the case of noncash property, by administrative sale. This 
process is comparatively simple and inexpensive for the Service because it 
usually can be effected by collection personnel only. In entireties cases, 
though, that preferred route typically will be infeasible, and the Service 
will be required to act through judicial sale under section 7 403 .190 
The section 7403 avenue requires the revenue officer to send the case 
to Service counsel, which, if it concurs, then must send the case to the 
Department ofJustice Tax Section for commencement of the proceeding. 191 
The proceeding can be protracted and costly because "[a]ll persons having 
liens upon or claiming any interest in the property" must be joined in the 
action. 192 Moreover, the net proceeds of any ensuing sale are divided 
among the parties in proportion to their respective interests in the 
property. 193 Dividing the proceeds requires valuation, likely through expert 
testimony, thus adding to the expense. 194 Thus, the costs in time and 
dollars will incline the Service to go beyond lien attachment only as a last 
resort. 
Second, unless pursued selectively and handled carefully, enforced 
collection in entireties cases presents public relations hazards that are 
potentially dangerous to the Service institutionally and the revenue officer 
personally. 195 There naturally will be sympathy for the nondebtor 
spouse. 196 Heavy-handed enforcement by the Service in such cases could 
become, either fairly or with exaggeration, 197 media and political fodder. 
189 See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 12-14, Craft(No. 00-1831). 
190 See infra text accompanying notes 21 0-15. 
191 Section 7403 actions are brought in federal district court and are within the purview 
of the Department of Justice. See I.R.C. § 7403(a) (West Supp. 2001). 
192 I.R.C. § 7403(b) (2000). 
193 See id. § 7403(c). 
194 See Johnson IV, supra note 60, at 564-65. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 186-87. 
196 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 917-18 (D.N.J. 1995), ajf'd 
without opinion, 74 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1995). 
197 Many of the accusations that propelled the 1998 legislation to passage have been 
discredited. See, e.g., Ryan Donmoyer, Secret GAO Report Is Latest To Discredit Roth's 
IRS Hearings, 87 TAX NOTES 463 (2000). The accusations, however, received incompara-
bly more media and political attention than their subsequent refutation. 
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Accordingly, in this era of the "ten deadly sins,"198 this potential is 
unlikely to escape notice by revenue officers. The Service likely will rest 
at mere attachment of the lien unless some factor in the case shifts the 
equities in favor of more aggressive collection. The following are factors 
the Service will consider in judging the benefits of more aggressive 
collection: 
( 1) Whether the property is cash or non cash. The fact that the 
real property in Craft had been sold and the case was about 
dividing a pot of cash, was helpful to the Govemment. 199 
(2) Whether the property is central to the marital union or the 
welfare of the couple. The marital residence usually will be the 
most sensitive type of property200 and probably will be actively 
pursued by the Government only rarely. Depending on the 
circumstances, certain other kinds of property also may be 
sensitive, an awareness reflected in various current statutes and in 
administrative practice.201 
(3) Whether the nondebtor spouse colluded with the debtor 
spouse. One of the problems with the pre-Craft rule was that it 
created a ready pathway for abuse. By filing separate returns and 
holding their properties by the entireties, spouses effectively could 
underpay their taxes with impunity from collection, especially in 
the full bar jurisdictions. 202 That is not to say that all entireties 
estates were vehicles for such abuse. Some were, but many were 
not. How the equities of the particular enforcement case are 
perceived will depend in part on whether the facts show that the 
nondebtor spouse colluded with the other spouse or participated in 
a scheme to defeat tax collection.203 
Third, a final reason why the Service often will rest at mere lien 
attachment is that frequently lien attachment alone will result in payment of 
part or all of the assessments, without the need to take more terminal 
198 See supra text accompanying note 187. 
199 See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 12-13, Craft (No. 00-1831) 
(providing remarks of Kent L. Jones, Esq., Assistant to the Solicitor General). 
200 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 704 (stating that "we are not blind to the fact that in 
practical terms financial compensation may not always be a completely adequate substitute 
for a roof over one's head"). 
201 See Johnson IV, supra note 60, at 566 (describing such statutes and practices). 
202 See id. at 556 (describing the permutations of this strategy). 
203 See id. at 560. 
472 37 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 
action. This could happen in any of several ways: 
( 1) Sometimes, the spouses voluntarily will pay an amount correspond-
ing to the value of the debtor spouse's interest in the property. They will 
do this to put the matter behind them or, more frequently, to remove the 
cloud on title and make the property saleable.204 This happened occasion-
ally before Craft; it will happen much more frequently now. 
(2) Sometimes the Service will be able to "piggy back" onto a 
collection proceeding brought by another creditor. Lenders in entireties 
states, aware of the problems faced by separate creditors, typically require 
both of the spouses to be obligors. If the loan is not repaid, the lender (a 
joint creditor and, thus, eligible to proceed) may seek payment out of the 
entireties property. The Service will be joined in such a case, or will 
intervene, on account of the tax lien. Depending on the values and the 
priorities of the various claims,205 the Service may receive some payment 
without being required to initiate action against the property. 
(3) Divorce is common. If there is some prospect of divorce in a 
particular case, the Service could simply wait. When, on account of 
dissolution of the marriage, the entireties estate is converted into a tenancy 
in common,206 the Service then could proceed against the now-severable 
property interest of the debtor spouse. 
( 4) Should the ages or health of the spouses suggest that the nondebtor 
spouse is likely to die first, the Service may wait until, by virtue of 
survivorship, the debtor spouse becomes the sole owner of the whole 
property. 201 
Thus, Craft provides only that the tax lien attaches. Mere attachment 
of the tax lien to the entireties property does not significantly compromise 
the interests of the nondebtor spouse. Moreover, for a variety ofreasons, 
the Service often will leave the matter at the stage of mere lien attachment, 
taking a "wait and see" approach to further developments. 208 
204 See infra text accompanying note 214. 
205 See generally I.R.C. § 6323 (2000). 
206 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
207 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
208 In waiting, the Service would need to be alert to when the statute of limitations on 
collection will expire in the given case. However, if the Government begins, within the 
limitations period, a suit to reduce the assessment to judgment, the resulting judgment can 
be enforced at any time during its legal life, even after the ten years. See I.R.C. § 6502(a) 
(2002). 
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3. Enforced Collection Not Threatening 
Although the Service often will rest at mere attachment of its lien, in 
many entireties cases it inevitably will proceed to enforced collection in 
some cases. Will such cases pose unacceptable risks to nondebtor 
spouses?209 I think not. My conclusion rests on two pillars: (1) the only 
practicable enforced collection option for entireties cases is judicial sale 
and division of proceeds under section 7403, and (2) section 7403 sale-and-
division entails substantial safeguards that will adequately protect 
nondebtor spouses. 
The Court noted in Rodgers that the Service normally has three main 
tools of enforced collection.21° First, the Government may "sue for the 
unpaid amount, and, on getting a judgment, exercise the usual rights of a 
judgment creditor. "211 Second, the Service may levy under section 63 31 
followed, in the case of noncash property, by administrative sale under 
section 6335. Third, the Government may request that a federal district 
court authorize a sale of the property and a division of the proceeds among 
the Service and the other claimants who are interest-holders under section 
7403. 
The first of these options will be unavailing in entireties situations 
except in the easiest cases. Having obtained a judgment, the Government 
still would need to collect on it. If the delinquent had enough nonentireties 
assets to satisfy the judgment, the Government could have levied on those 
assets without bothering to obtain a judgment. If the delinquent's 
nonentireties assets are not enough, the Government will be back in the 
original position. Obtaining a judgment is unnecessary in easy cases and 
not helpful in hard ones. 
The second option-administrative levy and sale-would be impracti-
cable in entireties situations.212 The Service could sell only what it got 
from the debtor spouse, that is, the debtor spouse's interest in the property. 
But that interest would be subject to and could not derogate the similar 
interest of the nondebtor spouse. Thus, among other limitations, any 
209 Throughout, I have referred to nondebtor spouses, not to "innocent spouses." As 
noted above, some nondebtor spouses collude with their debtor spouses to use entireties 
ownership as an avenue of tax abuse; others do not. See supra note 60. Nondebtor spouses 
includes both of these groups. Innocent spouses is a more restrictive term, morally 
speaking, which, in our context, properly applies to the second group but not to the first. 
210 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 680-83. 
211 Id. at 682; see I.R.C. §§ 6502(a), 7401, 7402(a). 
212 For further development of this point, see Johnson IV, supra note 60 at 560-61. 
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purchaser of the debtor's interest from the Service would be unable to eject 
the nondebtor from occupation and use of the property, would be unable to 
transfer or encumber the property without the nondebtor's consent, and 
would lose his interest entirely ifhe predeceased the nondebtor.213 No one 
would buy the debtor's interest from the Service under such circumstances, 
at least not at a price making the effort worthwhile for the Service.214 
Thus, neither of the principal alternatives is likely to be helpful to the 
Service in entireties situations. When the Service feels compelled to move 
beyond mere attachment of its lien, it typically will do so through the third 
alternative: section 7403 sale and division of proceeds.215 
In upholding the section 7403 sale of homestead property in Rodgers, 
the Court noted that"§ 7403 is punctilious in protecting the vested rights of 
third parties caught in the Government's collection effort, and in ensuring 
that the Government not receive out of the proceeds of the sale any more 
than that to which it is properly entitled."216 There are four reasons why 
this is so. 
First, the Service alone conducts administrative levy and sale. In 
contrast, although the Government initiates a section 7403 proceeding by 
petition, a court controls the procedure and makes the decisions. 
Second, "[a ]11 persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the 
property ... shall be made parties" to the section 7403 proceeding.217 
Thus, the court will have the advantage of hearing all viewpoints and 
considering all interests. 
Third, the court is not compelled to grant the Government's request to 
sell the property. The statute is phrased permissively.218 Accordingly, the 
Court held in Rodgers that the district court has equitable discretion to deny 
213 Cf Elfelt v. Cooper, 485 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1992) (stating that purchaser from 
Service of debtor spouse's interest in homestead in joint tenancy was divested of interest). 
214 It is widely recognized that, for this reason, undivided interests in property are 
essentially unsaleable by the Service. E.g., United States v. Bierbrauer, 936 F.2d 373, 376 
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 917 (D.N.J. 1995), ajf'dwithout 
opinion, 74 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bachman, 584 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 
(S.D. Iowa 1984). 
215 The Court emphasized in NBC that Congress provided the Service with multiple 
collection tools and that the courts should not superintend the Service's discretion to choose 
among those tools. See Nat'/ Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 730-33. My point here is 
that, although the Service does have discretion, practical considerations normally constrain 
it to exercise that discretion in favor of the section 7403 option. 
216 Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 699. 
217 I.R.C. § 7403(b) (2000). 
218 See id. § 7403(a) (stating that the court "may" decree a sale). 
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sale,219 although such discretion is limited, not open-ended.220 In fact, 
district courts often exercise such discretion.221 In all likelihood, there 
would be considerable sympathy for nondebtor entireties spouses in district 
courts, especially when sensitive property is involved or substantial 
hardship is threatened. 222 
Fourth and finally, when the district court does authorize sale of the 
property, the nondebtor spouse will receive a share of the proceeds 
corresponding to such spouse's proportionate interest in the property.223 
The Court has held that this compensation arrangement obviates possible 
due process objections to the sale. 224 
I have argued that the legitimate interests of nondebtor spouses will not 
be unduly compromised as a result of Craft. That is not to say that life will 
be precisely the same for nondebtor spouses after Craft as before it. For 
example, before Craft, nondebtor spouses could, by their unilateral 
decision, prevent entireties property from being converted into cash via 
sale. Were a section 7403 sale to occur after Craft, that power would no 
longer be absolute. Does that significantly disadvantage the nondebtor 
spouses? No. Three reasons explain such an answer. 
First, the unilateral power to block the sale of entireties property still 
prevails in the vast majority of situations. It remains in all nontax 
situations. Even in tax situations, sale against the nondebtor spouse's 
wishes would be averted more often than not. As noted above, the Service 
often will not seek to go beyond mere attachment of the lien. 225 If it does, 
219 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 703-09. 
220 See id. at 709-11 (discussing the factors a district court must consider before 
exercising this discretion). 
221 See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1381-83 (S.D. Ga. 2000); 
United States v. Johnson, 943 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Kan. 1996). 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1995), affd without 
opinion, 74 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1995). The Service had assessments against one spouse 
only, a tax protestor, in a partial bar state. Applying the Rodgers factors, the court refused 
to sell the marital residence under section 7403. As an alternative remedy, it directed the 
nondebtor spouse to pay the Service each month half the imputed rental value of the 
prope~, to be credited to the unpaid taxes. See id. at 920. 
22 This raises the important issue of how to value entireties interests. Craft remanded 
the valuation issue to the Sixth Circuit. See 122 S. Ct. at 1426. For a detailed discussion of 
the issue, see Johnson IV, supra note 60, at 564-68. 
224 See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697-99; see also United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970) (recognizing the right to just compensation by nondebtor 
interest-holders). 
225 See supra subpart IV.B.2. 
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the couple could preserve cherished entireties property by paying off the 
tax liability with their other assets, and, in extreme cases, the district courts 
may exercise their discretion not to sell.226 
Second, the gate swings both ways. Both spouses-the debtor spouse 
as well as the nondebtor spouse--<:an block the other's desire to dispose of 
property. Presumably, cases now exist in which the debtor spouse is 
preventing sale of property the nondebtor spouse wants to sell. In such 
cases, a section 7403 sale would provide relief to the nondebtor spouse 
because of the adequate compensation requirement of section 7403. Thus, 
cases in which dispositions undesired by the nondebtor spouse occur will 
be partly or fully offset by cases in which dispositions desired by the 
non debtor spouse now can occur. Because of Craft and section 7 403, cases 
of enhanced freedom will counter cases of lessened freedom. 
Third, some loss of flexibility for some nondebtor spouses should not 
be viewed as decisive. We have never viewed an owner's right to hold 
onto property as absolute when a strong public interest is involved and the 
owner will be adequately compensated. One example is the power of 
eminent domain pursuant to which a unit of government may force citizens 
to sell their property, whether entireties or not, to the unit. 
Another example is the treatment of entireties interests in the 
bankruptcy process. Assume only one spouse files a bankruptcy petition. 
The resultant bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property,"227 including that spouse's interest in entireties 
property.228 The bankruptcy trustee typically is empowered to sell the 
whole of the property, notwithstanding objection by the nondebtor spouse, 
and then to pay the nondebtor the value of his or her interest in the 
property, retaining the remainder of the sale proceeds to pay creditors.229 
This approach reminds one of section 7403, and the courts have viewed it 
as adequately protecting the debtor spouse.230 
Similarly, in the tax collection area, NBC indicates that a balancing of 
interests is appropriate.231 Any loss of prerogative that exists after the 
above mitigations is marginal. We accept it in eminent domain and 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 218-22. 
227 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l) (2000). 
228 See, e.g., In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1985). 
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), (h) (2000). 
230 See, e.g., Jn re Koehler, 6 8.R. 203, 206 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); see also H.R. 
REP. No. 95-595, 177 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6137-38. 
231 See supra text accompanying note 160. 
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bankruptcy. Surely, the loss of prerogative should yield to the Govern-
ment's strong interest in collecting taxes that are owed. 232 Lien attachment, 
even if followed by section 7403 sale, merely would bring to the entireties 
area a balancing well known and accepted as reasonable in other areas. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Craft was long overdue. It overthrew an anomaly with respect to 
entireties property in the law of federal tax collection, and was compelled 
by fidelity to the Court's precedents in the collection area. The concerns 
that have been voiced about Craft are understandable as part of the process 
of human beings adjusting to change, but they do not reflect genuine 
problems. In particular, fears that Craft infringes on the legitimate 
prerogatives of the states and that nondebtor spouses will suffer unduly as 
a result of the implementation of Craft are misplaced or can be assuaged by 
intelligent and sensitive decisions by the Service and the courts. Craft was 
rightly decided, and it should not be scary. 
232 As the Court has observed, "[n]o more essential or important power has been 
conferred upon the Congress" than its constitutional power to lay and collect taxes. United 
States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370 (1939). 
